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A framework for analysing the
microbiological commons
Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom
The plant-patent business is taking right hold, apparently.
We know a man who received a birthday present of a nice
little azalea. Tied around the azalea’s stem, like a chastity
belt, was a metal tag from Bobbink and Atkins, reading,
‘‘Asexual reproduction of this plant is illegal under the
Plant PatentAct’’. It wasNumber 147. Our friend, aman of
loose personal habits, ripped the tag off angrily, fed it to his
dachshund puppy and sent the plant to a friend in
Connecticut with instructions to bed it down warmly next
to an old buck hydrangea. From The New Yorker, 1936
(White 1990)
Ever since God warned Eve to resist
the apple, authorities have tried to
control information flows. And
ever since Eve took that first bite,
pioneers have resisted these con-
trols and tried to find ways around
them. (Spar 2001, p. 9)
The adaptation of the ‘‘com-
mons’’ to the realm of knowl-
edge and information is a
relatively recent phenomen-
on.1 Prior to the mid-1990s,
the commons referred almost
exclusively to shared land to
and other types of natural
resources (Hess 2000). The commons conveys
the notion of shared ownership, participation,
and responsibility. Where the term ‘‘commons’’
has recently arisen, as with scientific information
and the intellectual public domain, it is a rallying
cry to protect and sustain free access.
The first workshop devoted exclusively to the
microbiological commons (MC) was held in
Brussels in 2005 on the theme ‘‘Exploring and
exploitingmicrobiological commons: contributions
of bio-informatics and intellectual property rights
in sharing biological information’’. It is very useful
in defining the microbiological commons. One
can immediately see that the MC is interdisciplin-
ary (combining microbiology, information techno-
logy, law, and economics); that it requires further
study; that it has possible benefits, and that it
has a social and even a moral component. In
their background paper for the workshop,
coordinators Dedeurwaerdere and Dawyndt
(this issue) point to the crucial importance of
scientific data sharing on
the interaction of complex
social processes in which
participants have multiple
interests, pressures, and
motivations.
Geneticist Gary Zwei-
ger has observed that as
recently as 15 years ago
‘‘most biologists had little
use for computers other
than to compare DNA se-
quences and communicate
with each other over the
network that later evolved
into the Internet’’ (Zweiger
2001, p. x). Today there has been a radical
transformation of biology into an information
science (p. xi).
As information scientists, biologists concern themselves
with the messages that sustain life, such as the intricate
series of signals that tell a fertilized egg to develop into a
full-grown organism, or the orchestrated response the
immune system makes to an invading pathogen. Molecules
convey information and it is their messages that are of
paramount importance.
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By transducing the genome – transferring its
information content into an electronic format –
Zweigler cautions that ‘‘we acquire greater
responsibilities, becoming stewards of our own
genome’’ (2001, p. xv). And, we might add, we
acquire greater responsibilities as stewards and
preservers of genomic, indeed, all scientific
information.
The MC encompasses micro-organisms as
physical objects (resources), the scientific study,
the knowledge products, and the human and
social capital required to generate that knowl-
edge. The success of freely sharing microbiolo-
gical data requires an intricate blend of
technology, scientific content, metadata and
technical standards, open source software
packages, negotiated and respected intellectual
property rights agreements, sustainability and
preservation design mechanisms, evolving rules
and institutions, surety from theft, infiltration
and terrorism and, ultimately, a firm commit-
ment on the part of providers and users to the
common good.
In this article we contribute to this new
research agenda by presenting an analytical tool
to help better understand this new type of
commons. We also argue the critical importance
of collective action in the success and ultimate
sustainability of this commons. The complexity
of the issues is enormous for many reasons: the
vast number of players, multiple conflicting
interests, rapid changes of technology, the
general lack of understanding of digital technol-
ogies, local vs global arenas, and a chronic lack
of precision about the information resource at
hand. In order to bring greater clarity to this
complex commons, we apply the institutional
analysis and development (IAD) framework as
an exploratory tool. Applying this framework,
we will illustrate that collective action and new
institutional design play as large a part in the
shaping of scholarly information as do legal
restrictions and market forces.
Natural resource commons, such as forests,
fisheries, and irrigation systems, have a large
body of international, interdisciplinary litera-
ture (Hess 2006). Curiously, most of the
literature on the knowledge and scientific
commons that has been written over the past
10 years is not so much an outgrowth of the
traditional commons literature. Rather, the
knowledge and scientific commons and its
literature have arisen in direct response to
observable enclosure of information and corre-
sponding collective-action initiatives. We refer
to the concurrence of these two trends as
‘‘duelling revolutions’’ – two forceful, worldwide
movements leading toward opposite or conflict-
ing outcomes. One of the trends is a movement
toward enclosure and privatisation of scientific
information. The other is a movement toward
greater access and exchange of information.
Both of these revolutions have been brought on
by globalisation and the unprecedented capa-
cities of information technology.
The intellectual history of enclosure of the
commons dates back to the European enclosure
movements from roughly the fifteenth to the
nineteenth centuries. Commons were shared
agricultural fields, grazing lands, and forests
that were, over a period of 500 years, enclosed.
Communal rights to them were withdrawn by
landowners and the state. The narrative of
enclosure is one of privatisation, the haves vs
the have-nots, the elite vs the masses. This is the
story of Boyle’s (2003) second enclosure move-
ment with the enclosure of the ‘‘intangible
commons of the mind’’, through rapidly ex-
panding intellectual property rights. The occur-
rence of enclosure is an important rallying cry on
the part of legal scholars, librarians, scientists,
and anyone who is alert to the increasing
occurrence of privatisation, commodification,
and withdrawal of information that used to be
accessible, or that will never be available in our
lifetimes.
New types of enclosures are often caused,
in part, by the ability of new technologies to
capture resources that were previously un-
owned, unmanaged, and thus, unprotected. This
is the case with outer space, the electromagnetic
spectrum, and, of course, with digital informa-
tion. The capturability of previously uncaptur-
able public goods is what transforms them from
public goods into commons.
The case of distributed digital technologies
is particularly complex and problematic as many
stakeholders seek to renegotiate their interests
in the new digital environment. The enclosure of
scientific information is occurring at breakneck
speed. Much of it has been brought on by
corporate and private interests that have influ-
enced the rapid increase of intellectual property
rights legislation that diminishes the public
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domain and accelerates the number of patents in
science. Copyright terms have been extended
and the definition of what is patentable has been
widened. The time-honoured tradition of open
science is crumbling with the increasing corpor-
atisation of higher education, where university-
corporate partnerships seek private revenue
from publicly funded research. But the enclosure
of scientific information that once was freely
available has other causes: from governments’
removing information and online resources to
the simple lack of preservation of databases and
websites.
The antithetical trend of building free and
open access (OA) to scientific information has
been accomplished primarily through collective-
action initiatives. Collective action is action taken
by a group for the purpose of attaining some
shared goal or objective. It requires cooperation
and if sustained over time, it usually includes
rules: decision-making structures and some kinds
of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms.
The traditional commons literature is rife
with studies on the problems of collective action
and social dilemmas, such as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, free riding, poaching, polluting, and
general non-cooperation. It is therefore quite
interesting to see the varieties of successful types
of collective action that have arisen in the
relatively new arena of the knowledge commons:
Free/Open Source Software (FOSS) movement,
the Open Archives Initiative, the Berlin Declara-
tion, and theOAmovement are familiar examples.
This trend of unfencing and opening up
access to information is rooted in the concept of
commons as shared spaces, free speech and the
democratic process, as with the US New England
town commons. This is the narrative of Benkler’s
commons-basedproduction, where cooperation is
achieved through ‘‘social mechanisms other than
price signals or managerial directions. Large-scale
instances of such cooperation are ‘peer produc-
tion’’’ (Benkler 2004, p. 1110). This trend utilises
inter-operability, open science, collaboratories
and scholarly networks, voluntary associations
and collective action for the common good.
Defining the commons
Commons is a general term that refers to a
resource that is shared by a group of people. In a
commons, the resource can be at the local level,
such as the workplace water cooler or a town’s
pavements and playgrounds, where the commu-
nity of users are limited and usually identified.
Commons can also exist on regional, national,
and global levels, such as regional and national
highways, deep-sea oceans, the atmosphere, the
Internet, and scientific knowledge. In extremely
large commons, the user community is diverse and
unidentified. The commons can be well-bounded
(community forests, irrigation systems, libraries);
transboundary (Zambezi River, migrating wild-
life, the electromagnetic spectrum); or without
clear boundaries (knowledge, the ozone layer).
Much of the traditional, natural-resource
commons literature is focused on commons as a
property regime or as an economic good.
Common property is a formal or informal
regime and, as shared property, it is distinct
from private, public, and other forms of
property. Common-pool resources (CPRs) are
economic goods that are subtractable or rival-
rous and are difficult to exclude others from use.
These characteristics distinguish CPRs from
private, public, and club goods, as illustrated
in Table 1.
Natural resource commons usually tend to be
rivalrous while knowledge has traditionally been
fairly non-rivalrous. The unifying thread in all
commons is that the resource is jointly used and
managed by groups of varying sizes and interests.
Core to all commons are issues of collective action,
efficiency, equity, and sustainability.
Participation in the knowledge and MC
commons requires increased responsibilities
upon all members: greater understanding of
the resource, better communication, evolving
Table 1. Types of goods
Subtractability
Low High
E
x
cl
u
si
o
n
Public Goods Common-Pool
Resources
Difficult Sunset Irrigation systems
Common
knowledge
Libraries
Toll or Club
Goods
Private Goods
Easy Day-care centres Doughnuts
Country clubs Personal computers
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rules and norms, greater security and effective
monitoring and sanctioning in order to protect,
sustain, and preserve the resources.
In Hess and Ostrom (2003), we examine the
role of collective action in countering trends of
enclosure and privatisation of the intellectual
public domain. We give examples of authors
writing their own copyright agreements, nego-
tiating with their publishers and self-publishing
their articles and papers. The OA movement is a
clear example of individuals and communities of
authors working outside traditional legal and
economic constraints in order to build new
systems and networks. OA means ‘‘immediate,
permanent, free online access to the full text of
all refereed research journal articles’’ (Harnad
2005). It is a dynamic example of collective
action working effectively to build a global
knowledge commons. In the same article we try
to develop some insights on collective-action
initiatives that have developed along with new
information technologies, legislation, markets,
and practices.
Social dilemmas
What we have learned from the traditional
commons research is that it is characteristic of
all of the phenomena broadly linked under the
term ‘‘the commons’’ that multiple users are in
someway sharing a resource.Whenever multiple
individuals share a resource, potential problems
exist. Enormous energy and work must be
devoted to producing and effectively managing
any resource. Since a group of individuals will
benefit, there can be incentives to free ride on the
production process or to carelessly generate
pollution. Free riding occurs when one person
seeks their self-interest at the expense of others
by not contributing to a joint effort when the
person will benefit from the contributions of
others. Free riding occurs in a variety of ways
including not contributing to the production and
provision process at all, contributing only a
little, or finding ways of grabbing products-
in-process in such a way that one can privatise
them for one’s own benefit in the long run.While
free riding is borrowed from the economics
literature, the fairly synonymous term ‘‘social
loafing’’ is frequently used by sociologists
and other social scientists to describe online
behaviour.
Ownership
As a commons or a common-pool resource,
different parts of the MC may be owned by
national, regional, or local governments; by
communal groups; by private individuals or
corporations; or used as OA resources by
whomever can gain access. Each of the broad
types of property regimes has different sets of
advantages and disadvantages, but at times may
rely upon similar bundles of operational rules.
Examples exist of both successful and unsuccess-
ful efforts by governments, communal groups,
cooperatives, voluntary associations, and pri-
vate individuals or firms to govern and manage
common-pool resources. Thus, no automatic
association exists between common-pool re-
sources and common-property regimes – or
any other particular type of property regime.
The list of seven bundles of rights shown
in Table 2 is open to further examination. We
suspect there could be many more types of
ownership arrangements with digital information.
A framework to analyse the
microbiological commons
A colleague once wrote, ‘‘public problems, like
all genuine problems, are surrounded by
Table 2. Bundles of rights
Access The right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non-subtractive benefits.
Contribution The right to contribute to the content.
Extraction The right to obtain resource units or products of a resource system.
Removal The right to remove one’s artifacts from the resource.
Management/participation The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by
making improvements.
Exclusion The right to determine who will have access, contribution, extraction, and
removal rights and how those rights may be transferred.
Alienation The right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights.
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confusion’’ (Oakerson 1978, p. 50). The two
main resources required for problem solving, he
continued, are theory and information. Scholars
associated with the Workshop in Political
Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana Uni-
versity have found that employing a framework
helps to organise analytical and prescriptive
inquiry (Gibson 2005, p. 229; Imperial and
Yandle 2005). The IAD framework (see Fig. 1)
has been used for over three decades as the
general theoretical structure that scholars have
used to study a diversity of human-physical
world relationships.
One can think of the IAD framework as
scaffolding that holds a universal set of intellec-
tual building blocks. This analytical tool can be
used to investigate any broad subject where
humans repeatedly interact so that rules and
norms guide their choice of strategies and
behaviour. It is quite adaptable and has been
used in hundreds of disparate subjects, such as
understanding how best to restore the Great
Lakes (Sproule-Jones 1999); monitoring fishery
management (Rudd 2004); analysing environ-
mental governance (Myint 2005); modelling
operational decision making in public organisa-
tions (Heikkila and Isett 2004) and studying the
interactions of local irrigation systems (Lam
2001). The scaffolding orients the analyst to ask
particular questions about a nested set of
variables that frequently helps one to dig into a
problem and identify why a particular distribu-
tion of interactions and outcomes is generated.
As such, the framework helps to more clearly
manifest human-technology-resource relation-
ships and reveal how decisions and behaviour
lead to outcomes. Its foundations are drawn
from the field of political economy, where
understanding the effects of rules and decisions
on performance is critical. A methodology such
as the IAD framework can help better under-
stand knowledge gaps as well as the governance
issues.
Institutional analysis looks at the artisan-
ship-artifact relationships. Policy analyst
Vincent Ostrom has often likened this type
of analysis to the process of breadmaking where
a baker (the artisan) applies decisions and
methods in the mixing, kneading, rising, and
baking (artisanship) in order to produce a loaf of
bread (the artifact). The complexity of the
coordination, actions, and decisions increases
ACTION
ARENA
Attributes of the
Community
Evaluative
Criteria
Actors
Action
Situations
Outcomes
Patterns of
Interactions
Rules-in-Use
Bio-Physical
Characteristics
Figure 1. Institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework
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dramatically when the loaf of bread is being
produced by a large bakery rather than a lone
baker. In adapting the IAD framework to the
microbiological commons, we will start at the
large bakery level and scale up from there,
although individual behaviours do matter. For
this analysis, we apply the framework to the
digital (in silico) material that is shared in the
global microbiological commons, not the biolo-
gical material that has different rules and levels
of complexity.
The physical and institutional
characteristics
The left side of the framework in Fig. 1 focuses
on the physical and institutional aspects of the
resource. The physical characteristics include the
material conditions of the commons, the attri-
butes of the community and the formal and
informal rules-in-use. These variables on the left
of the framework are exogenous factors in the
analysis.
Physical characteristics: ideas,
artifacts, and facilities
With the distributed nature of digital informa-
tion, the complexity of the physical character-
istics may be daunting. With many natural
resources, the physical characteristics can re-
main constant until the introduction of new
technologies (one need only think of the impact
of chainsaws on forest ecology). Starting with
conversion of data to zeros and ones and packet
switching with TCP/IP in the 1960s, the physical
characteristics of the artifacts holding knowl-
edge were changed dramatically. The introduc-
tion of interoperable, distributed data also
radically changed the community of users from
an elite group of scientists to a global, hetero-
geneous group from all strata of society.
In traditional commons research, scholars
have found it helpful distinguishing between the
resource system and resource units. In ground-
water, for instance, the groundwater basin is the
facility, while the shared portion of the water is
the flow. The complex nature of knowledge as a
commons requires a threefold distinction be-
cause it is made up of both human and non-
human materials (Hess and Ostrom 2003). The
‘‘physical’’ characteristics of the knowledge
commons are ideas, artifacts, and facilities (see
Fig. 2).
Ideas are coherent thoughts, mental images,
creative visions, and innovative information.
Ideas are the intangible content and the non-
physical flow units contained in artifacts. There
are certain idea-types such as mathematical
formulae, scientific principles, grammar, names,
words, numbers, and facts that are not protected
by copyright and are considered to be in the
public domain (Samuelson 2003, p. 151). Ideas in
digital form, however, do not have the same
protections as they did in the pre-digital world
(Samuelson 2003, p. 164). The most notable
characteristic of an idea is that it is a pure public
good and, therefore, non-rivalrous. One person’s
use of it does not subtract from another’s.
Traditionally, ideas are part of the public domain.
Artifacts are discrete, observable, nameable
representations of ideas, such as articles, re-
search notes, books, databases, maps, computer
files, and web pages. To use the term from
copyright law, they are the expressions of the
ideas. Traditional knowledge artifacts (such as
books and journals) are rivalrous. Digital
artifacts can often be used concurrently by
multiple users. Artifacts are the physical flow
units of a facility. Artifacts are the expressions of
the ideas presented in a myriad number of
formats, from the traditional paper, binding,
microfilm, video, and so on to state-of-the-art
computer graphics, text files, holograms, MIDI
files, searchable databases, and so forth.
Attributes of the
Community
Rules-in-Use
Bio-Physical Characteristics =
Ideas Artifacts
Facilities
Figure 2. The bio-physical characteristics
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Facilities store artifacts and make them
available. Traditional facilities have been libraries
and archives containing books, journals, papers,
and other knowledge artifacts. These facilities
had physical limits. The physical network infra-
structure includes the optical fibre, copper wire
switches, routers, host computers, and end-user
workstations (Bernbom2000). It also includes the
amount of bandwidth, free space optics, and
wireless systems. The new technologies that have
made electronic, distributed information possible
are also a part of the evolving physical conditions
of the knowledge commons.
Seen from one perspective, a taxonomic
database, for instance, would logically be an
artifact of ideas, data, and metadata. Seen as an
integrated entity, the same database could be
considered a facility. Nevertheless, there is a
challenge in understanding the physical char-
acteristics of scientific data in order to begin
integrating it. Computer scientist Joe Futrelle
(2001) talks about scientific data exploding in
terms of resolution, complexity, heterogeneity,
and volume. Gerstein and Junker describe the
gradual blurring of boundaries between scien-
tific texts and biological databases:
complex scientific data sets will become tightly integrated
and entwined with the literature, with the interface to
publications moving away from simple keyword search
models to one reflecting the structure of biological
information itself. People will increasingly browse data-
bases arranged around chromosomal location, biochemical
pathways and structural interactions that are linked to
relevant articles, or parts of articles such as individual
paragraphs, tables or figures. One might ‘fly through’ a
large three-dimensional molecular structure, such as the
ribosome, where various surface patches would be linked to
publications describing associated chemical binding stu-
dies. (Gerstein and Junker 2001)
Identifying the bio-physical characteristics
should be one of the first tasks in analysing the
MC. One must identify and clarify the nature
of the resource. This elementary step is often
Children pass by a stall with booklets about generally modified organisms at theWorld Social Forum held in Bamako
in January 2006. AFP/Jean-Philippe Ksiazek
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overlooked in the knowledge/scientific com-
mons literature. Authors frequently write about
the Internet as a commons. The Internet, the
worldwide network of inter-operable computer
networks, however, can be many commons: the
computer infrastructure and protocols can be
thought of as a commons; chat rooms, discus-
sion groups and listservs are types of social
commons; the information content can be a
commons; institutional repositories are types of
commons; and even university budgets for
information technology can be viewed as a
commons. These and other disparate aspects of
the Internet can be considered commons when
they are shared resources that require steward-
ship by a group.
It is important to remember that all knowl-
edge and all information – whether hard copy or
digital – is a human artifact, with agreements
and rules strongly tied to the rules of language
itself.2 Thus, knowledge has an important
cultural component as well as intellectual,
economic, and political functions. As such, it is
a flow resource that must be passed from one
individual to another to have any public value.
The artifacts and facilities function as the
conduits of expressed ideas that serve to
replenish the creation of new ideas. The MC
content will be shaped by the scope of the
subject. The basic characteristics can be sum-
marised as text documents (ideas/artifacts),
primary data (artifacts), software (facilities),
and (biological resource) centres/laboratories/
libraries (facilities). There are literally thousands
of microbiological collections.
Attributes of the community
Who exactly shares this resource? One way to
identify the community is to look behind who is
doing the data production, data management,
and data processing (Desmeth and Dedeurwaer-
dere 2005) as well as who is participating in data
sharing (Dedeurwaerdere, this issue). The MC
community would be an international epistemic
group composed primarily of scientists, tea-
chers, technologists, and information specialists.
The production, management, and processing
communities would be nested at various levels
within this global commons.
Whether the values of a community are
shared or divided substantially affects the
strategies adopted within action arenas and the
resulting patterns of interactions. Formerly,
academics were unified in their quest for the
creation and production of new knowledge, even
if divided by discipline. Today, there are
conflicting values within the academy. This is
also an era of rapid change in the values pursued
by individuals who participate in the knowledge
arena. In an earlier and slower world, the
community using any of the components of the
knowledge commons usually shared common
values related to the creation of new knowledge,
teaching students the knowledge they would
need in order to be productive members of a
community, a society and an economy and
providing general information necessary for the
sustenance of a democratic society. If these
values erode or change dramatically, the result-
ing physical conditions and action arenas are
also strongly affected.
Traditionally, with commons, research has
shown that homogeneity within a community
can be an important ingredient in the ultimate
robustness of a commons. The size and famil-
iarity of a community are also critical factors in
the analysis of traditional commons. In the
global networked environment, one might well
ask, what makes an online community homo-
geneous (or not)? One could also ask, what is
local? If a community of providers and decision-
makers is unified as to the purpose and goals of
the resource, then the community can be said to
be homogeneous. It could be that for online MC
communities, epistemic cohesion serves as a
virtual locality.
Rules-in-use
Rules are shared, normative understandings
about what a participant in a position must, must
not, or may do in a particular action situation,
backed by at least a minimal sanction ability for
non-compliance (Crawford and Ostrom 2005).
When these normative instructions are merely
written in administrative procedures, legislation,
or a contract and not known by the participants
or enforced by themor others, they are considered
rules-in-form. Rules-in-use are generally known
and enforced and generate opportunities and
constraints for those interacting.
New rules or laws can be made based on
lack of adequate information, awareness, or
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understanding of the true nature of the issues.
Often the rules are hard to see, as is the case with
protocols, standards, and computer code. Nu-
merous obvious and non-obvious rules apply to
different levels of digital resources, such as
institutional repositories and the microbiologi-
cal commons. There are rules about who makes
the rules and who enforces the rules. There are
usually rules about who may contribute to the
resource and who may not. Subject and institu-
tional boundaries would need to be defined.
Rules for sustaining and preserving the
resources would need to be constantly evolving.
Much has been written about the nature
and levels of rules.3 The rules are the institu-
tional underpinning of the resource. Whether
the rules are generally understood and followed
can determine the outcome and success of the
commons.
The action arena
Action arenas are composed of participants
making decisions in a situation affected by the
physical and institutional characteristics that
will then result in varying outcomes. Many
theorists choose to start the IAD analysis with
the action arena, focusing on the actors and the
parts they play in an action situation. Variables
to be considered are what actions are taken and
how do those actions affect outcomes; how
much control does each participant have and
how much information do they have about the
situation? Are decisions being made to address
short-term dilemmas or are long-term solutions
being sought? What are the possible outcomes?
What are the transaction costs?
One of the more puzzling action situations
in the OA movement within the whole knowl-
edge commons arena concerns the establishment
of institutional repositories and the seemingly
ubiquitous dilemma of non-compliance and how
to get authors/scientists to contribute their
research artifacts to an institutional repository
(IR). While it is relatively fast and cheap to set
up an IR, it is not easy to populate it with
voluntary contributions from the author com-
munity. The incentives for authors to make their
works available online with free and open access
have been demonstrated repeatedly.4 Some
analysts have indicated that lack of information
may be a barrier; that once authors know the
facts about self-archiving, they will comply (see
Rowlands et al. 2004; Suber 2002, 2004). Some
institutes and universities have endorsed the
Berlin Declaration5 by establishing mandated
OA publishing for their communities. But for
many universities, mandates for author publish-
ing systems are too far of a leap into radical
institutional change.
The analysis of the action arena with
specific actors and action situations, along with
a minimal number of variables, is a crucial step
in assessing patterns of interactions and ultimate
outcomes.
Patterns of interaction
In a commons, how the actors interact strongly
affects the success or failure of the resource. Are
the participants able to gain sufficient informa-
tion about the structure of the situation, the
opportunities they and other participants face
and the costs of diverse action? Do they develop
increasing trust that the situation helps to
generate productive outcomes and in the ex-
pected behaviour of others? Patterns of interac-
tion can be strongly conflictual, however,
especially when there is hyperchange in the
community of users and their values and goals.
In addition to conflict, interactions may be
simply unfocused and unthinking – a part of a
growing ‘‘culture of carelessness’’ (Barron 2000)
where quick-fix solutions take the place of
collaborative analytical processes. In the uni-
versity community, patterns of interaction may
be influenced by hierarchies, lack of respect, and
distrust that often accompanies the tribalism of
disciplines and subdisciplines (Thorin 2003).
Outcomes
In some cases it is easier to apply the framework
by starting with the outcomes. The outcomes are
often the initial question-raisers. Why are global
biodiversity efforts failing? Is the digital divide
increasing? Analysis can also be motivated by
confusing and conflicting outcomes, such as why
some IRs are well populated while so many
others are not. Frequent outcomes addressed in
the commons literature are those concerning the
enclosure of formerly open and public informa-
tion and the creation of new digital commons
that provide better access to information.
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Writers tend to point to outcomes that they
like – such as widespread access to scientific data
– or dislike – such as children having ready access
to pornographic materials, without much analysis
of the complex interactions that led to these
outcomes. The IAD framework leads one to factor
in the physical and institutional nature of a
resource to better understand the context of specific
actions. The variables in an action situation lead
to patterns of interaction that ultimately lead to
outcomes.
Within the broad spectrum of the knowledge
commons, there are a myriad number of compet-
ing outcomes – some of which are considered
negative, while others are seen as positive (see
Table 3).
The conflicting outcomes reflect a highly
complex resource where new technologies have
increased capabilities to harvest information as a
commodity. There are now multiple uses by
expanded communities for the same resource –
not just scholarship, but entrepreneurship, com-
petition, and financial gain. Because the out-
comes are often the result of numerable actions,
it is helpful to keep an interdisciplinary frame of
mind. The desired outcome may be the dissemi-
nation and preservation of the scholarly record,
but contributing factors in the outcome formula
are new computer technologies, financial con-
straints, university corporatisation, declining
numbers of tenured faculty, lack of information,
and new intellectual property-rights legislation.
How does the community protect the
information from private interests that could
collect the information and repackage it in a
new, for-profit, database? What types of intel-
lectual property rights will apply?
The outcomes for institutional repositories
– all still in their infancy – are as yet unclear.
Will they take hold and become rich scholarly
resources that contain an accurate record of an
institution’s output over time? Or, will they be
patchy, inconsistent facilities that more accu-
rately reflect non-compliance and indifference?
Evaluating outcomes
In addition to predicting outcomes, the analyst
may also evaluate the outcomes that are being
achieved as well as the likely set of outcomes that
could be achieved under alternative institutional
arrangements. Evaluative criteria are applied to
both the outcomes and the interaction among
participants that leads to outcomes. While there
are many potential evaluative criteria, some of
the most frequently used criteria are (i) increas-
ing scientific knowledge, (ii) sustainability and
preservation, (iii) participation standards, (iv)
economic efficiency, (v) equity through fiscal
equivalence, and (vi) redistributional equity.
Increasing scientific knowledge
One of the core evaluations made of scientific
research is whether it leads to an increase in the
knowledge that has been recorded and made
available to other scholars, students, and the
public at large. The evaluation of increasing
scientific knowledge can be based on the amount
of high-quality information available; the quality
and usefulness of the common pool; the local and
global usage of the information and the percentage
of free OA information vs closed, proprietary
information. One can also evaluate the mark-up
Table 3. Potential positive or negative outcomes in various knowledge commons
Negative outcomes Positive outcomes
Proprietary scientific databases (enclosure) Open access research libraries (access)
Digital divide and information inequity (inequity) Global use, provision, and production (equity)
Lack of standards across collections (degradation)
Conflict and lack of cooperation
Standards and interoperability of digital information
(diversity and rich commons)
Lack of quality control (pollution) Cooperation and reciprocity (social capital)
Overpatenting and anti-commons (enclosure) Quality control of content (richness)
Non-compliance (weak resource) Open science (enhanced access/communication)
Withdrawal of information (instability,
degradation, depletion)
Compliance and participation (well-populated repositories)
Preservation of information (access)
Spam (pollution) Scholarly blogs (enhanced quality information and
communication)
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language, metadata, and format standards that
facilitate or restrain interoperability.
Sustainability and preservation
Sustainable systems are those that meet current
needs of many individuals involved in producing,
deciding, and using a commons (for example,
students, faculty, researchers, librarians, adminis-
trators, citizens, public officials) without compro-
mising the ability of future generations also to
meet their needs. Thus, when evaluating the
sustainability of a system, one needs to examine
the processes involving interactions among parti-
cipants and whether they increase the physical,
social, and human capital involved or slowly
erode that capital. In regard to ecological systems,
sustainability has usually meant the maintenance
of the capacity of an ecological system to support
social and economic systems over time (Berkes
et al. 2003, p. 2). When applied to a knowledge
commons, one is askingwhether these systems can
themselves survive over time as well as supporting
ecological, social, and economic systems through
increased access to relevant information. Are
there preservation strategies in place? Such
strategic plans will need to factor in changing
actors and participants, adaptive software sys-
tems, and constantly evolving rules. One also
needs to examine institutional long-term commit-
ments to the preservation of the resource.
Economic efficiency
Economic efficiency is determined by the mag-
nitude of the change in the flow of net benefits or
costs associated with an allocation or realloca-
tion of resources. The concept of efficiency plays
a central role in studies estimating the benefits
and costs or rates of return to investments,
which are often used to determine the economic
feasibility or desirability of public policies.
When considering alternative institutional ar-
rangements, therefore, it is crucial to consider
how revisions in the rules affecting participants
will alter behaviour and, hence, the allocation of
resources. Many studies have already shown the
economic efficiency of OA publishing, but
finding the appropriate rules for sharing the
new costs of this form of publication is still
under development.
Equity through fiscal equivalence
There are two principal means to assess equity: (i)
on the basis of the equality between individuals’
contributions to an effort and the benefits they
derive and (ii) on the basis of differential abilities
to pay. The concept of equity that underlies an
exchange economy holds that those who benefit
from a service should bear the burden of financing
that service. Perceptions of fiscal equivalence or a
lack thereof can affect the willingness of indivi-
duals to contribute toward the development and
maintenance of resource systems.
Redistributional equity
Policies that redistribute resources to poorer
individuals are of considerable importance.
Thus, although efficiency would dictate that
scarce resources be used where they produce the
greatest net benefit, equity goals may temper this
objective, resulting in the provision of facilities
that benefit particularly needy groups. This is
relevant to the ever-widening digital divide.
International scientific collaboration is steadily
increasing, but the information divide between
the haves and have-nots is also increasing.
Should universities from developed countries
take a more active role in providing access
services with partners in developing countries?6
Redistribution objectives, however, tend to
conflict with the goal of achieving fiscal equiva-
lence, and tough decisions must frequently be
made to prioritize distribution needs.
Requirements of adaptive governance
in a complex system
Researchers who have focused on the govern-
ance of natural resources have struggled with the
question of why some self-governing systems
have survived for many years (some as long as
1,000 years), while others collapse within a few
years, or even after a long and successful era.
There is no simple answer. One of the core
problems that has been documented is that rapid
change in the environment and in the commu-
nity is always a major challenge for any
governance system. Over time, scholars have
come to a general level of agreement that there
are several requirements that somehow need to
be met for a governance system to be adaptive
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and robust over time. These are providing
information, dealing with conflict, inducing rule
compliance, providing infrastructure, and being
prepared for change (see Dietz et al. 2003). A
wide diversity of specific ways of meeting these
requirements has been observed. Let us briefly
discuss each of these requirements.
Providing information (reflexivity of
knowledge basic to all systems)
All effective governance systems at multiple
levels depend on good, trustworthy information
about stocks, flows, and processes within the
entities being governed, as well as about the
relevant external environment. This information
must be matched with the level of aggregation
that individuals are using to make decisions. All
too often, large flows of data are aggregated.
Decisions are, however, frequently made by
much smaller units where there is substantial
variance from the average reported in the
aggregated data. Information must also fit with
decision-makers’ needs in terms of timing,
content, and formof presentation. Informational
systems that simultaneously meet high scientific
standards and serve ongoing needs of decision-
makers and users are particularly useful.
Dealing with conflict
Sharp differences in power and in values among
interested parties make conflict inherent in all
choices of any importance. Conflict resolution
can be as important a motivation for designing
institutions as is the concern with building and
maintaining a resource itself. People bring
varying perspectives, interests, and fundamental
philosophies to problems of the scholarly com-
mons. Conflicts among perspectives and views, if
they do not escalate to the point of dysfunction,
can spark new understandings and better ways of
accomplishing outcomes. The core problem is
designing conflict-resolution mechanisms that
enable participants to air their differences and
to achieve resolutions that they consider legit-
imate, fair, and scientifically sound.
Inducing rule compliance
As we have learned, effective governance also
requires that, whatever rules are adopted, they
are generally followed, with reasonable stan-
dards for tolerating small variations that always
occur due to errors, forgetfulness, and urgent
problems. It is generally most effective to impose
modest sanctions on first offenders and gradu-
ally increase the severity of sanctions for those
who do not learn from their first or second
encounter (Ostrom 1990). The challenge in
designing a new governance system is how to
use informal strategies for achieving compliance
at the beginning that rely on participants’
commitment to a new enterprise and the rules
they have designed and subtle social sanctions.
When a more formal system is developed, those
who are the monitors and those who impose
sanctionsmust be seen as effective and legitimate
by participants or rule evasion will overwhelm
the governance system.
Providing infrastructure
Infrastructure includes physical and institu-
tional structures and technology. Thus, the
infrastructure affects how a commons can be
utilised, the extent to which waste can be
reduced in resource use and the degree to which
the physical conditions of a resource and the
behaviour of users can be effectively monitored.
Indeed, the ability to choose institutional
arrangements depends in part on infrastructure
– largely in regard to ways of storing and
communicating information. Infrastructure also
affects the links between local commons and
regional and global systems.
Be prepared for change
Institutions must be designed to allow for
adaptation because some current understanding
is likely to be wrong, the required scale of
organisation can shift and biophysical and social
systems change. Fixed rules are likely to fail
because they place too much confidence in the
current state of knowledge, while systems that
guard against the low probability, high conse-
quence possibilities and allow for change may be
suboptimal in the short run but prove wiser in
the long run. This is a principal lesson of
adaptive management research.
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Conclusion
The premise of this article has been that the
application of the IAD framework provides a
useful, tested method for analysing commons
dilemmas. We expect that the framework will
evolve to better fit with the unique attributes of
the production and use of a knowledge commons.
We have illustrated the advantage of factoring in
the exogenous conditions of the physical char-
acteristics, community attributes, and rules-in-
use in order to better understand the processes at
play with certain actions and those involved in
those actions. The framework can then lead one
to recognise how those factors, in combination
with patterns of interactions, can influence out-
comes. Over time, it will be possible to extract
design principles for robust, long-enduring
knowledge commons. After more efforts succeed
and others fail, it will be easier to understand
what makes the MB commons work and how
best to govern, protect, and sustain it.
Notes
1. This is a revised version of the
paper presented at the workshop
on ‘‘Exploring and Exploiting
Microbiological Commons:
Contributions of Bioinformatics
and Intellectual PropertyRights in
Sharing Biological Information’’,
Brussels, Belgium, 7–8 July 2005.
We would like to thank the
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
for their generous support.
2. Vincent Ostrom has repeatedly
emphasised the artifactual nature
of knowledge and institutions:
‘‘Every development – street
sweeping, production of
fertilizers, irrigation works, the
development of new seed stocks –
a component to it that is
concerned with how the activities
of people are organised in relation
to one another’’ (1969, pp. 2–3).
3. See Ostrom (2005, chapter 2)
for a discussion of operational,
collective-choice, and
constitutional-choice levels of
rules.
4. See the Open Citation Project
(2005) for a compilation with links
to these studies.
5. Conference on Open Access
to Knowledge in the Sciences
and Humanities, 20–22 October
2003, Berlin, available from
http://www.zim.mpg.de/open
access-berlin/berlindeclaration.
html [Accessed 22 November
2006].
6. This draws on the idea of
‘‘common but differentiated
responsibilities’’ frequently
applied in international law and
promoted in the World Summit
on Sustainable Development,
Johannesburg, August 2002. See
A CISDL Legal Brief, Centre for
International Sustainable
Development Law, available from
http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/
brief_common.pdf [Accessed 22
November 2006].
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